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Anti-cartel enforcement is central to antitrust and is its crucial component in terms
of effects on a country’s productivity growth (Buccirossi et al. (2013)). Cartels, how-
ever, remain a widespread phenomenon with serious consequences to society.1 Opti-
mizing anti-cartel enforcement is therefore an important public policy issue.
Public and private competition law enforcement have complementary objectives
and, in general, tend to reinforce each other. However, a conflict between them may
arise in the fight against cartels. This conflict may be due to the central role played
by leniency programs (LPs) in cartel probes. LPs provide a fine reduction (up to im-
munity) to cartel members in exchange for reporting the cartel and further cooperation
with an investigation.
Private actions for damages may jeopardize LPs since a leniency application in-
creases the risk of a successful damage action by the cartel’s victims in two main ways.
First, the evidence provided by the leniency applicant may be used by the claimants to
prove the existence of the infringement and its effects.
Second, leniency applicants, and especially immunity recipients, normally do not
challenge in court the infringement decision adopted by the competition authority
(CA), at least as far as the existence of the cartel is concerned and, under joint lia-
bility they may be the first to be targeted. Therefore, the incentive stemming from the
avoidance of a fine may be counterbalanced by the increased risk of being condemned
to pay damages.
Two issues are particularly important for the interplay between LPs and private
damages. The first issue is whether leniency applicants (and in particular, the immu-
nity recipient) should have the same level and type of liability as all other cartelists.
The second issue is whether access to the leniency statements and related documents
should be granted to the claimants in the damage action.
1See Levenstein & Suslow (2006) and Marshall & Marx (2012), among others.
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These two issues go beyond the discretion that is attributed to competition author-
ities and need to be addressed through specific laws. Different solutions have been
adopted in different jurisdictions.
In the US, victims of an antitrust infringement are entitled to treble damages and
cartel members are jointly and severally liable for these damages.2 Moreover, the ap-
plicable discovery rules allow claimants in a damage action to obtain full disclosure of
all relevant documents, including those provided by the leniency applicants.3
To reduce the risk of the effectiveness of the US LPs being undermined, the US
Congress enacted the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA)
in 2004. It eliminates treble damages and joint liability for the amnesty recipient
(i.e. the first successful leniency applicant), who also has a duty to cooperate with
the claimants in the civil action. Hence, the cooperating party is only exposed to own
single damages, while the other conspirators remain jointly liable for the remaining,
treble damages. ACPERA did not change the rules concerning the disclosure of rele-
vant documents so that claimants can still rely on the evidence provided by the leniency
applicants.
The new EU Directive (European Commission (2014)) disciplines the matter in
the EU.4 With regards to liability, the Directive provides that the immunity recipient is
jointly and severally liable as to its direct and indirect purchasers or providers. It is also
liable to other injured parties but only if full compensation cannot be obtained from the
other cartel members (Art. 11(4)).
With regards to access to documents submitted by a leniency applicant (not only the
immunity recipient), the Directive provides that national courts cannot order the disclo-
2Note that although there are treble damages in the US, Lande (1993) has effectively argued that, even in
the US, claimants are able to recover only a fraction of their actual losses.
3Note that, while judges do not request the leniency documents from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
they can subpoena the firms and obtain all of the evidence a firm provided the DOJ with. This does not
necessarily mean that there is always access to full evidence from the leniency statements for damage actions.
4The Directive has been fully transposed in the national legislation of all Member States. While the
deadline was December 2016, 21 member states failed to meet this deadline and the last transpositions were
implemented in March 2018 (Greece) and June 2018 (Portugal).
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sure of leniency statements and settlement submissions. (Art. 6(6)). Moreover, article
7(1) provides that Member States shall ensure that evidence in these two categories
is either deemed to be inadmissible in actions for damages or is otherwise protected
under the applicable national rules.
The fact that all LP statements and settlement submissions are “secreted” can be
particularly worrisome in the light of an increasing number of cases in which the
EC awarded some degree of leniency to - and then settled with - all cartel members
(Marvão & Spagnolo (2018b)). In these cases, the final decision will likely have a very
limited informational content.
A rather interesting measure was adopted in Hungary in 2009, before the directive,
where the immunity recipient was only liable for compensating the cartel’s victims if
and only if the other cartel members were unable to do so.5 To the best of our knowl-
edge, this was the only jurisdiction in which the immunity recipient had liability of last
resort. The protection granted to the immunity recipient did not prevent the access to
the information and evidence provided to the competition authority.6
For simplicity, in the following we will refer to the three legal regimes described
above as the US, the EU and the Hungarian solutions. The immunity recipient has full
liability in the EU solution for direct and indirect damages and remains jointly liable
to other injured parties only if the other cartelists cannot compensate these damages in
full, detrebled and single (rather than joint and several) liability in the US solution and
liability of last resort in the Hungarian one. The access to evidence is lower in the EU
solution than in the US and Hungarian ones because in the EU the use of the evidence
provided by the leniency applicants is prevented.
In this paper we theoretically analyze the interaction between these rules and the
effectiveness of leniency programs in terms of the effects on general deterrence. Our
5Art.88D of the Hungarian Competition Act (1996), revised in 2009.
6The relevant information could be requested directly from the competition authority (or from the courts).
Similarly to the US regime, this does not necessarily mean that there is always access to full evidence from
the leniency statements for damage actions.
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theoretical analysis also allows us to examine whether the US, EU, and Hungarian so-
lutions are appropriate, taking into consideration both the objective of preserving (or
improving) the effectiveness of the LP and the objective of guaranteeing the right to
compensation of the cartel’s victims.
We investigate whether pursuing the primary goal of the public enforcement sys-
tem, i.e. achieving an optimal level of deterrence of anti-competitive conducts, neces-
sarily requires sacrificing the amount of damages that claimants can expect to recover,
or whether, these two objectives can both be pursued in a consistent and complemen-
tary way, and if so to what extent and how. We focus on leniency awarded to parties
that spontaneously report the cartel when the CA is unaware of its existence, since this
type of leniency has unambiguously positive effects on deterrence, as long as sanctions
are robust.7
In Spagnolo (2004), it is shown that, in order to maximize deterrence in the pres-
ence of a LP, it is optimal to minimize the amount of damages paid by the first (and
only the first) leniency applicant. However, how much information from the leniency
application has to be disclosed in the civil action and the right of victims to be com-
pensated were not taken into account.
We extend Spagnolo (2004) to include these two additional elements. We determine
the optimal combination of damage liability of the immunity recipient and the amount
of information which should be accessible to the claimants (including leniency state-
ments), both in terms of deterrence and of the ability of victims to be compensated. In
doing so, we also take into account strategic risk as a novel deterrence channel, which
recent experimental research has shown to be important for collaborative crimes like
cartels. In the appendix, we provide suggestive evidence on the real world relevance of
this deterrence channel from cartels recently convicted by the European Commission.
7On the contrary, leniency awarded when the CA is already aware of the cartel’s existence has ambiguous
effects (see Motta & Polo (2003)). Hence, the reduction of fines granted by the European Commission to
applicants that provide their collaboration after the launch of the investigation may be spurred by the desire
to have access to evidence that strengthens the decision, like a substitute for plea bargaining, but may overall
have a negative impact on deterrence (see Marvão & Spagnolo (2015)).
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We find that, normally, there is no conflict between the two objectives, contrary to
what is presumed in the legal debate. To maximize the attractiveness of the LP and
deterrence, it is optimal to (a) minimize the amount of damages the immunity recipient
is liable for, and (b) maximize the share of information collected by the competition
authority and made accessible to the claimants, including leniency statements.
Therefore, we suggest a legal regime in which cartelists are jointly and severally
liable toward all cartel’s victims with the exception of the first successful leniency ap-
plicant who is kept immune from fines and civil liability in any case and independently
of the other cartel members’ ability to pay awarded damages in full. We also propose
that full access to the leniency statements is granted to the claimants in the ensuing
damage actions. In the following, this regime is referred to as “our proposal”.
We then extend the model to include the cost of being the preferred target of the
damage actions. We find that this extension further increases the efficiency gain of our
proposal.
Our proposal and the Hungarian regime are identical in the case in which the im-
munity recipient is not required to pay awarded damages as the other cartelists have
sufficient assets to do so. Hence, in order to assess the effectiveness of the two regimes
in general we have to extend the analysis and consider the possibility of bankruptcy.
We show that our proposal is still optimal in terms of deterrence. However, in this situ-
ation, a trade-off between deterrence and victims’ rights for compensation may emerge.
We show that, in this scenario, the Hungarian solution maximizes the value of expected
liquidated damages while preserving deterrence in many cases.8
We then examine customers’ welfare, leaving aside allocative efficiency consider-
ations. We argue that the available evidence on bankruptcy risk, the share of recovered
damages and the rate of cartel detection, are worthy reasons to presume that the benefit
of our proposal, relatively to the Hungarian solution, is larger than its cost, even only
8Follow-on actions for damages may contribute to deterrence also by giving an incentive to cartels’
victims to inform competition authorities of suspect behavior. This mechanism is not discussed in the paper
as we focus on cartels that are uncovered through a LP.
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in terms of how many (actual and potential) cartel victims are likely to remain uncom-
pensated.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates this paper
to the relevant economic and legal literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model.
Section 4 evaluates the different scenarios and discusses deterrence linked to both in-
centives to deviate and strategic risk, under the assumption of no bankruptcy. Section 5
examines the case in which firms’ assets may be insufficient to cover the damages they
are liable for. Section 6 discusses the impact of being the preferred target in damage
actions, and the trade-off between deterrence and compensation. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs and derivations are in the Appendix.
2 Literature review
The possible conflict between public and private enforcement has originated a long
and ongoing debate in many jurisdictions. In the EU, this culminated with the 2014
Directive. In this section, we review this legal debate and the economic literature on
the trade-off between public and private enforcement.
2.1 The recent legal debate
2.1.1 Pre-directive EU damages’ system
Before the adoption of the Directive, the issues of liability of the immunity recipient
and access to leniency statements, were dealt with by applying some general legal
principles.
The first relevant principle, as stated by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the
Manfredi (2006) and Courage (2001) judgements, is that the victims of an antitrust
infringement have the right to be fully compensated for the harm they suffered.9 If
9Judgement of the Court of Justice of 13 July 2006, joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, ECR
I-6619; and judgement of the Court of Justice of 20 Sept. 2001, case C-453/99, Courage, ECR I-6297.
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a more favorable treatment of an immunity recipient with respect to its civil liability
hindered the effective exercise of this right to full compensation, it would run against
this principle.
With regards to the access to the leniency statements, in a judgement concerning a
referral from the district court of Bonn in Germany (Pfleiderer case) the ECJ ruled that
EU law does not prohibit a third party, who has been adversely affected by a breach
of competition law, from having access to a leniency application by the infringer.10
The court held that it is for the national judge to determine the conditions under which
access to leniency material can be granted to someone seeking to obtain damages.
According to the ECJ, the national judge would need to take into account and weigh
all the interests protected by EU law, namely the need to ensure the effectiveness of
LPs and to support antitrust damage actions.11 This position has been confirmed in
the more recent Donau Chemie judgement, where the ECJ affirmed that national courts
must balance these possibly conflicting interests on a case-by-case basis, taking into
consideration all the relevant facts of the case.12
2.1.2 Legal literature
Jurisdictions around the world are increasingly making efforts to improve private
enforcement tools and cases of private cartel damages are on the rise. However, the le-
gal debate remains active regarding the coexistence of private and public enforcement
(eg. Shavell (1997), Segal & Whinston (2007), Lande & Davis (2011) and Bernard
(2012)).13
10Judgement of 14 June 2011 in the case C-360/09.
11On 30 January 2012, the German court which had brought the case before the ECJ concluded that access
to leniency documents should be denied.
12Case C-536/11 - Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and others.
In the light of these judgements it would be interesting to understand whether the European Court of
Justice will consider the rule that impedes access to leniency statements a “balanced” solution that correctly
takes into account the fundamental right of the victims to full compensation, as affirmed in the Manfredi and
Courage judgments.
13The question of whether private enforcement should be added to public enforcement is not within the
scope of this paper and an extensive survey on private and public enforcement of antitrust law can be found
in Segal & Whinston (2007). However, private enforcement is always beneficial if courts are sufficiently
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Shavell (1997) was one of the first to explore the differences between the social and
private incentives to litigate from a legal perspective. He argues that achieving a num-
ber of litigations which is neither socially excessive nor socially inadequate requires
corrective social policies and the guarantee that the claimants have more knowledge
than the public regulators have or could possibly obtain. The author points out that low
litigation costs allow more plaintiffs to access justice but encourages them to sue firms
even in cases where the social costs exceed the social benefits.
In the EU, the legal debate has been particularly active regarding the interaction
between LPs and damage claims. This is closely related to the question posed in this
paper. Cauffman (2011) and MacCulloch & Wardhaugh (2012) suggest that the ef-
fectiveness of leniency should prevail and, therefore, the leniency applications should
not be disclosed, whereas Komninos (2011) proposes a case-by-case approach. In
addition, Komninos (2011) and Cauffman (2011) suggest that the immunity recipient
should have limited liability. These proposals are somewhat in line with what has been
approved in the 2014 Directive.
Two other papers examine the Directive itself. In line with the results of our for-
mal analysis, Kortmann & Wesseling (2013) and Geradin & Grelier (2013) view the
Directive as being flawed in the sense that the liability of immunity recipients should
be further reduced.
2.2 Economic literature
Bourjade et al. (2009) study, theoretically, the effect of encouraging private actions
for breaches of EU competition law by developing a model of litigation and settlement
with information asymmetry. The authors conclude that it is better to increase damages
than to reduce the cost of suing.
McAfee et al. (2008) develop a theoretical model which compares private and pub-
accurate (McAfee et al. (2008)) and in this paper we assume this is the case.
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lic enforcement and find that, if the courts resolve with a low error level, then only
legitimate suits are submitted and the optimal solution is the conjunction of public and
private enforcement. This is because private parties have a better signal of the violation
than the public agency. The authors assume that private and public entities’ only choice
is whether to sue the potential antitrust infringers and that public entities aim to max-
imize social welfare. In this scenario, they propose a system where private claimants
pay a subsidy for public investigation in exchange for a monetary award following a
conviction.
In line with our analysis is the theoretical model from Silbye (2012), which models
the incentive to apply for leniency as a negative function of the total amount of damages
that the leniency applicant is liable for. The author shows that antitrust damages, in the
presence of a LP, can be pro-collusive if the leniency applicant is not given immunity
also on damages.
More directly relevant to the analysis in this paper is Spagnolo (2004), which
showed that eliminating liability for one LP applicant only (and awarding immunity
to the first applicant only) is optimal from a purely general deterrence perspective.14
It also showed that distrust among cartel members, i.e. the fear of being reported by
a co-conspirator, constitutes the main deterrence channel for collaborative crimes by
introducing the concept of distrust (i.e. strategic risk).15
Bigoni et al. (2015b) provide experimental evidence on the power of this previously
ignored deterrence channel for collaborative crimes, showing that cartel formation falls
dramatically when a strict LP is introduced, even with communication and in the ab-
sence of public enforcement.
The paper is of course also related to other work in the recent but extensive litera-
ture on the economics of leniency programs, starting with the contributions by Motta
& Polo (2003), Aubert et al. (2006), Buccirossi & Spagnolo (2006) and Harrington
14This proposal is also supported by some practitioners (see e.g. Green & McCall (2009)).
15Leslie (2004) argued, from a legal point of view, that it is indeed important to take into account distrust
among cartel members as a source of deterrence.
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(2008). A more comprehensive review of the empirical and experimental evidence on
the effectiveness of LPs can be found in Marvão & Spagnolo (2018a).
3 A simple model
We start by developing the simplest possible model from which to rigorously derive
our results. This is both because our results are very intuitive - although only a formal
analysis allows one to verify their robustness; and because we hope to reach the widest
possible audience, including the legal and policy domains.
3.1 The economic environment
Consider an economy composed of a continuum of industries. In each industry, two
symmetric firms produce a homogeneous good and repeatedly play a Bertrand game in
the infinite, discrete time. Firms may choose to enter a collusive agreement to maintain
a high price and escape the competitive outcome. If they do, and respect the agreement,
each of them earns (at most) collusive profits Π per period.
In each industry, firms share the same discount factor δ. However, each industry
has a different discount factor, for example because of different frequency of market
interactions, and the different industry discount factors are distributed according to the
c.d.f. G(δ) on the interval ( 12 , 1), so that absent law enforcement collusion is sustainable
in equilibrium in every industry.16
We assume that to reach a collusive agreement firms need to communicate, that
hard and compromising evidence is produced only after both firms agree to collude,
and that this evidence, available to cartel members, can also be found by a CA that
investigates the industry.
If a cartel forms between the two symmetric firms, the likelihood that the CA in-
vestigates, finds evidence on the collusive agreement and successfully prosecutes the
16With δ < 12 collusion is not sustainable, independently of antitrust enforcement.
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cartel members without any of them cooperating with the investigation (revealing in-
formation) is ρ, with 0 < ρ < 1. A leniency program (LP) is in place, encouraging
cartel members to self-report such hard evidence before any such investigation.
If a cartel is convicted because of an independent investigation by the CA, each
member must pay a fine F that, for simplicity, we assume is exogenously given, as in
most previous analyses. If a cartel is convicted because one of the firms reported the
hard information within the LP, the reporting firm becomes the immunity recipient and
pays no fine while the other pays the full fine F. If both parties apply for leniency, each
of them pays half of the fine.17
In each period, the timing of the game is therefore as follows:
• Stage 1: Each firm chooses whether to enter into a collusive agreement. If at least
one firm chooses not to collude, then competition “à la Bertrand” takes place and
the game ends for that period. The competitive Nash equilibrium generates zero
profits for both firms. Otherwise:
• Stage 2: Each of the firms chooses whether to respect the agreement and “col-
lude”, quoting the agreed upon price, or to deviate from it, undercutting the
agreed upon price. Firms can also choose whether to apply to the LP and report
the cartel to the CA. If at least one of the firms applies, the game ends for the
period. Otherwise:
• Stage 3: The CA chooses which industries to investigate, ρ realizes, and the
game ends for the period.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the stage game.
17The underlying assumption is that if both firms decide to report the cartel to the CA they have the same
probability of being the first successful leniency applicant.
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3.2 Legal regimes for damage claims
In addition to fines, cartel members are liable for compensation of buyers. The
maximum amount of damages for each firm is D, so that the maximum amount of
damages for which the cartel is liable is 2D. The fraction of these maximum total
damages that each convicted firm will have to pay if the cartel is convicted, depends
on the liability rules defined by the legislation and on the amount of information on the
cartel available to the plaintiffs suing for damages in the various situations.
Remark 3.1 Given that the total amount of damages parties are liable for (2D) differs
across countries (e.g. the US have treble damages whereas the EU Damage directive
allows only for single damages), our analysis is intended as a within country com-
parison of legal rules - e.g. how deterrence would change in the US if it adopted the
Hungarian solution, keeping the remaining features of US enforcement unchanged. It
should not be intended as a general comparison of deterrence of overall legal enforce-
ment across countries.
We denote by W the total value of each firm’s assets, so that the maximum value of
damages that each firm is able to pay is W − F = γD (where F = 0 for the immunity
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recipient). Then, γ is defined by this equality as the share of direct damages that each
firm is able to pay. We assume that W > F, both because it is realistic and to better
focus on the effects of liability rules for damages when bankruptcy is an issue.
We denote the amount of damages a given firm is liable for by DNR if no firm reports
under the LP; by DR if the firm reports under the LP but the other cartel member does
not; DOR if only the other cartel member reports the cartel under the LP; and DBR if
both do. In order to determine these values, we introduce the variables that represent
the two features of the legal regime whose effects we want to investigate.
The first variable is denoted by l ∈ [0, 2) and represents the extent to which the
immunity recipient is kept liable for damages, so that l = 0 represents the case in
which the first successful leniency applicant is fully immune also on civil grounds and
l = 1 identifies the case in which he does not obtain any reduction of his civil liability
but is not jointly and severally liable for the damages caused by the other cartelist.
Note that l may be larger than 1 if the leniency applicant remains liable towards the
purchasers of the other cartelist and the latter does not have enough assets to pay direct
damages in full.
The second variable is denoted by α and represents the amount of information that
is available to claimants. In particular, the various regimes differ with respect to the
accessibility of the documents provided by the leniency applicant.
The parameter α can take two values: αNR and αR. αNR is the amount of information
that claimants have if no firm applies for leniency; we assume that 0 < αNR < 1, i.e.
even if the cartel is uncovered by an autonomous investigation by the agency, and
there is no leniency applicant, the victims are still able to obtain information from the
standard proceedings, leading to a positive fraction of the damages being paid to the
litigants. The assumption implies that there is always room for improvement. This
element does not depend on the legal regime as the differences we are considering only
concern whether claimants can use the leniency documents.
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The parameter αR is the amount of information that claimants can use in the action
if they have access to the documents provided by the leniency applicant; we assume
that this additional source always improves the position of claimants and therefore that
αNR < αR ≤ 1.




DOR = 2αRD − DR;
We consider four legal regimes, where necessary indexed by L ∈ {E,U,H,O},
where E is the regime set in the EU by the Directive, U is the US regime, H is the
Hungarian one and O is our proposal. Throughout the analysis, we refer to the “solu-
tion” in each of these regimes as expressions to describe the legal choices concerning
the treatment of the policy variables lL and αRL, rather than the entire legal regime. So,
each regime is described by a pair L = (lL, αRL). The four regimes can be described as
follows.
The EU regime sets αRE = α
NR (because it prevents the disclosure of the evidence
provided by the leniency recipient). As for the other policy variable, the EU regime sets




this rule can be written as lE = max
{
1, 2 − γ
αNR
}
. The US regime sets lU = 13 (because
damages are detrebled for the leniency applicant who can also avoid joint and several
liability) and αRU = α
R (because judges can subpoena the firms and obtain all the evi-
dence a firm provided the DOJ with). In the Hungarian regime, we have that αRH = α
R
and lH = max
{
0, 2 − γ
αR
}
(because the leniency applicant is immune from civil liability
if the other cartelist can pay damages in full but remains joint and several liable towards
15
all claimants otherwise). Finally, our proposal is to set lO = 0 and αRO = α
R.







NR and lE = 1 > lU = 13 > lH = lO = 0. Our proposal and the Hungarian solu-
tion are identical in this setting which will be analyzed in the next section. However,
in section 5 we will extend the model to the case in which cartelists individually might
be unable to pay damages in full. This condition introduces a distinction between our
solution and the Hungarian one.
4 Analysis
In this section we will evaluate the effects of the different legal regimes on de-
terrence. We will first follow the approach standard in the literature that, following
Stigler (1964), only focuses on the temptation to move to a non-cooperative equilib-
rium and posits that a cartel is deterred when the (no-deviation) incentive compatibility
constraint for the cartel being an equilibrium is violated, so that collusion is not sus-
tainable in equilibrium.
An important aspect the standard approach misses is the considerable existing ev-
idence that each firm will also take into account the possibility and consequences of
being betrayed by the other cartel members when deciding whether to take part in a
cartel. A collusive agreement, to be viable, also requires that firms trust each other,
that they have sufficient confidence that, in each future period each co-conspirator will
stick to the collusive equilibrium and will not get “cold feet” and switch to competi-
tive strategies, reporting the cartel to obtain a lenient treatment, possibly for fear that
someone else would do that. In subsection 4.2 we will take this fully into account and
show that some rather puzzling implications of the standard approach disappear.
We start by assuming that γ ≥ 2αR, so that even if only one firm is kept fully liable,
its assets suffice to pay the maximum total cartel damages (2αRD). While we consider
this a realistic assumption, particularly for large cartels, in Section 5 we consider the
16
alternative case of damages potentially leading cartel members into bankruptcy. For
simplicity, it is also assumed that firms do not appeal decisions.
4.1 Deterrence as absence of collusive equilibria
To sustain collusion, agents use a grim-trigger strategy, which is reversion to a
permanent competitive Nash equilibrium, in case of deviation. The environment is sta-
tionary, so if no deviation is observed, firms continue to collude after they are convicted
by a random investigation by the CA.18
If the fine is sufficiently high, in all legal regimes a firm that deviates by under-
cutting the collusive price also finds it optimal to apply to the LP at the same stage
(Stage 2).19 To see this consider that a firm which deviates and reports the cartel to the
CA obtains the following short-run payoff: 2Π − lαRD, whereas a firm which deviates
without reporting obtains 2Π − ρ(αNRD + F). Hence “deviate and report” is preferred
to “deviate without reporting” if lαRD ≤ ρ(αNRD + F). If l = 0, as in our proposal
and the Hungarian solution, this condition is obviously satisfied independently of the
severity of the fine.
This condition also holds in the EU regime if ρF ≥ αNRD(1 − ρ) and in the US
regime if ρF ≥ D(α
R
3 − ρα
NR) i.e. if the expected fine is higher than the increase in
expected damages due to the leniency application. This threshold is certainly met if
the fine is set optimally, in the sense that its expected value is equal or higher than the
harm caused by the cartel.





ρF ≥ D, the right-hand side of this inequality is larger than 1, whereas the left-hand
18This is as in Chen & Rey (2013). The results would not change if we assumed that collusion would
stop, temporarily or permanently, after a successful conviction of the cartel linked to a random investigation,
without any deviation from the cartel partners.
19The theory of repeated games requires to focus on the optimal (most profitable) one-shot deviation from
the cooperative path (see e.g. Fudenberg & Tirole (1991)), and deviating and simultaneously reporting is the
optimal deviation in a leniency context, given that the statute of limitations for cartel infringement is usually
three to five years after the end of cartel behavior. Unfortunately, some old and new papers on this topic get
this basic issue wrong, focusing on sub-optimal deviations, thereby deriving incorrect results and misleading
policy implications.
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side is always weakly smaller than 1, as, with no bankruptcy, l, αR ∈ [0, 1], and the
condition is always satisfied. In any case, if the legal regime on fines is designed in a
way that a firm’s deviation payoff is higher if it does not report the cartel to the CA,
then the LP is totally ineffective. Since we are interested in understanding which rules
on civil liability make a LP more apt to deter cartels, we will assume that the expected
fine is sufficiently high to make the above conditions true also in the EU and in the US
regimes.20
Firms can therefore sustain a stationary collusive agreement in a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium if the expected gains from respecting the collusive agreement and not
reporting are larger than the expected discounted gains from optimally deviating and
applying for leniency.
If firms choose not to apply for leniency, they will earn in each period, a net profit
of Π minus the expected penalty (F + DNR). However, if a firm deviates and simulta-
neously applies for leniency, while the other firm complies, it will earn profits of 2Π
and it will receive fine immunity (F = 0), although it will still be liable for damages in
the amount of DR. The expected discounted values of colluding and not reporting the







VR (L) = 2Π − DR = 2Π − lLαRLD
The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) below, determines the minimum dis-
count factor δ (L) necessary for collusion to be sustainable in equilibrium:
VNR − VR (L) > 0↔ δ > δ (L) ≡ 1 −
Π − ρ(F + DNR)
2Π − DR
= 1 −
Π − ρ(F + αNRD)
2Π − lLαRLD
.
20This assumption does not imply any loss of generality because in the EU and in the US regimes, if the
leniency program is ineffective, the level of deterrence is always lower than the one which is achieved with
an effective leniency program, as shown in Appendix 8.1.
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Since collusion is sustainable in equilibrium only in those industries where δ > δ,
an increase in δ increases cartel deterrence, as it directly reduces the number of indus-
tries that satisfy the condition for collusion to be an equilibrium. The analysis of this
incentive constraint leads to our first result.
Proposition 1: The effectiveness of the leniency program in terms of deterrence, as
measured by δ(L), is smaller under the EU and the US solutions than under the Hun-
garian and our solutions.
Proof in Appendix 8.1.
The logic behind this result is very intuitive. Inspecting the incentive constraint,
it is clear that δ (L) increases when lLαRL decreases, making the constraint more diffi-
cult to satisfy. Since deterrence increases with δ, to maximize deterrence (the set of
industries in which a collusive equilibrium is not sustainable) lLαRL should be set at its
minimum, which is clearly lLαRL = 0. Given that α
R





αR > αNR > 0, this minimum, and hence maximal deterrence, can only be achieved
by limiting immunity recipients’ liability, i.e. by setting lL = 0 as we suggest. The
Hungarian solution is also optimal if there is no risk of bankruptcy, as assumed in this
basic version of the model, because it sets lH = 0 such that DR = 0.
Conversely, the legal regime determined by the US solution leads to a sub-optimal




It is noteworthy that if the immunity recipient’s liability can not be minimized (i.e.
lL > 0), then reducing the amount of information victims can access and use in private
damage suits (in particular, leniency statements), e.g. setting αRL = α
NR, as done by the
EU Directive, can lead to increased deterrence.
While simple, intuitive and in line with the literature, this standard analysis with
deterrence measured by how tight the incentive constraint is, indexed by δ, hence by
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the fraction of industries in which a collusive equilibrium exists, has limitations that
lead to rather counter-intuitive implications.
Puzzle 1: When the amount of damages the immunity recipient is liable for is set opti-
mally (lL = 0), the liability of colluding firms that did not apply for leniency (DOR) is
irrelevant for optimal deterrence, as it does not appear in the incentive constraint.
Puzzle 2: When the amount of damages the immunity recipient is liable for is set opti-
mally, the amount of information available to victims after conviction (αRL) is irrelevant
for optimal deterrence, as if lL = 0 then lLαRLD = 0 for any α
R
L.
These puzzling implications emerge because the damages expected by convicted
non-leniency applicants do not enter the ICC. This unrealistic feature, shared by all
models that focus on the cartel’s ICC, was already noted in Spagnolo (2004) with re-
spect to fines.
In the next subsection we will show that these puzzles disappear once we take into
account that satisfying the incentive constraint is typically not sufficient to achieve and
sustain cooperation/collusion. This is because potential cartel partners also need to
coordinate and trust that the others will comply with the illegal agreement rather than
betray them and apply for leniency. Experimental evidence indicates that this distrust
is the main deterrence channel for well designed leniency programs.
Before moving in that direction, we note that our solution does not affect the right of
cartel victims to be compensated. Indeed, in any case, victims obtain the total damages
awarded by the court (2αRD). The only difference is that in this regime this payment
comes from the other members of the cartel and not the immunity recipient (DR (O) = 0
and DOR (O) = 2αRD).
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4.2 Accounting for strategic risk
In the previous subsection we assumed that the collusive agreement is sustained
as long as the ICC is satisfied. In other words, we assumed that coordination on the
collusive agreement is always perfect and that the viability of collusion only depends
on each member’s own incentives to deviate (as analyzed by the ICC), i.e., the risk
of being reported by the other cartel member(s) being nonexistent in each and every
period of the cartel’s life and beyond.
Spagnolo (2004) models strategic risk, which can be interpreted as the risk of mis-
coordination between the collusive and non-collusive equilibria.21 After communicat-
ing and coordinating initially, firms playing collusive strategies and playing the non-
collusive strategy (which includes reporting if a cartel was present), and then contin-
uing to compete remain continuation equilibria of each and every future period in the
cartel’s life. It is possible that in any of these periods one player may switch to the
non-collusive equilibrium, since even if collusion is an equilibrium, individuals can be
discouraged from sticking to collusive strategies by the fear of miscoordination from
the other players.
This selection criterion predicts behavior better than Pareto dominance and since
the underlying force comes entirely from the strategies played by the other firm(s), it
is naturally defined “strategic risk”. A simple example can be found in Appendix 8.3.
In the presence of leniency (LP), this includes the risk of being betrayed by some
other cartel member who, any time during the cartel’s life, might abandon the collusive
equilibrium for the non-collusive one, for any reason, including the fear than someone
else might do it. When taken into account in the model, this concern may constitute
the tightest constraint for collusion to be viable, becoming the main deterrence chan-
nel for collaborative crimes. A strict LP (offering amnesty only to the first reporter),
together with sufficiently large fines for the remaining cartel members, may increase
21The game theoretic foundations of this concept have been developed in Blonski et al. (2011) and Blonski
& Spagnolo (2015).
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the loss from colluding while an opponent does not. This loss may make the option of
switching to competition and reporting first safe and attractive relative to incurring the
risk of being reported by another cartel member switching to competition, even though
sustaining collusion would be more profitable. A LP may then make the activity be-
come too risky to be undertaken in the first place.
Explicit communication may not be able to solve this problem because a wrong-
doer would gain by persuading its partner to trust him even if he plans to switch to the
non-cooperative equilibrium.22
Bigoni et al. (2015b) provide experimental evidence on the power of this deter-
rence channel for collaborative crimes, showing that cartel formation falls dramatically
when a strict LP is introduced, even with communication and in the absence of public
enforcement. This is because, with leniency, deterrence appears to be mainly driven
by an increased fear of being reported by other cartel members, or distrust. Therefore,
by increasing the cost of being betrayed by a partner in crime, the LP can generate a
higher demand for trust among criminals, and thus less crime for any given level of
initial trust.23
There is also suggestive real world evidence that confirms the laboratory evidence
on the importance of distrust for colluding firms. In Appendix 8.2, we present several
cases where the importance of distrust, and more generally of concerns about other
cartel members’ behavior clearly emerge from cartel members’ communication as re-
ported in the European Commission decisions.
In this subsection, we follow these recent advancements by also taking into account
distrust as a deterrence channel. We check whether and how the results of the previous
22Pre-play communication (i.e. cheap talk) can help solve the coordination problem in a pure coordination
game when the message is self-committing (i.e. the sender has an incentive to stick to the message if the op-
ponent believes it) and self-signaling (i.e. it is in the sender’s best interest to send a true message). However,
this game is not a pure coordination game, and the presence of a LP makes cheap talk not self-signaling.
Therefore, the selection of the cooperative equilibrium hinges on the parties’ mutual trust(Buccirossi, 2008).
23Additional experimental evidence of the importance of this type of distrust for cooperation/collusion in
infinite repeated games was found by Dal Bó & Fréchette (2011, 2018), Blonski et al. (2011) and Breitmoser
(2015), for infinitely repeated games, and by Bigoni et al. (2015a), Calford & Oprea (2017) and Embrey
et al. (2018) for finitely repeated and continuous time ones.
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section change in its light.
The analysis shows under which circumstances all cooperation equilibria are risk
dominated by the non-collusive equilibrium.24 The collusive equilibrium is more prof-
itable than the competitive one, but it exposes the firm to the risk of miscoordination, a
particularly costly event in the presence of a LP, as the opponent will then also report
the cartel to the CA. Following Spagnolo (2004), Blonski et al. (2011) and Blonski &
Spagnolo (2015) we can then derive a minimum level of the discount factor δ∗ nec-
essary for the higher strategic risk of a collusive equilibrium to be dominated by the
higher expected profits, so that subjects choose to collude.
To derive δ∗, in Appendix 8.3 we calculate the riskiness of the collusive agreement,
obtaining that collusion is risk dominated by reporting when






Π − ρ(F + αNRD)




where VNR′ is the numerator of VNR.
This new threshold discount factor δ∗ is larger than the δ, which is necessary for a
collusive equilibrium to exist in the first place, as long as
F
2
+ (1 − lL)αRLD ≥ 2Π. (2)





RD ≥ 2Π and in the Hungarian and our regime if F2 + α
RD ≥ 2Π. Hence,
if it holds in the EU regime it holds in all other regimes as well. We have to note that,
in the ICC, Π identifies the short-run gains from deviation. Therefore we can say that
the critical discount factor stemming from strategic risk considerations is larger than
the ICC critical discount factors in all regimes if the fine is at least four times the short
run gains a firm can obtain by deviating from the collusive equilibrium. We believe
24Blonski & Spagnolo (2015) show that the results do not change by moving away from full cooperation
to e.g., inefficient equilibria (see section 5 in their paper).
23
that this condition is likely to hold in all jurisdictions and for any cartel.
Indeed, the deviation gain only occurs for a ”period” (i.e. until the deviation is
detected and the punishment phase starts) whereas fines are set taking into account the
whole cartel duration that may span over a number of years. Moreover, CAs should
impose fines that exceed the overall collusive profits (over the entire cartel life) as they
will be discounted, by firms, by the probability of detection and conviction.
Therefore, in the following we will assume that the fine is “meaningful”, meaning
that it is large enough to make condition (2) satisfied also in the EU regime. Note
that our conclusions would be even stronger if we relax this simplifying assumption.
Indeed, in this case the relevant threshold would be δ(E) in the EU and δ∗(O) in the
regime we propose, if the less stringent condition that makes (2) true in our regime
holds. Since we already know that δ(O) >δ(E) we can surely conclude that deterrence
is stronger in our regime as δ∗(O) > δ(O). Given the assumption that the fine is “mean-
ingful”, maximizing deterrence while taking into account both incentives and strategic
risk considerations amounts to maximizing δ∗. By comparing δ∗ in the various regimes
we can state the following:
Proposition 2: Taking into account strategic risk (the fear of betrayal), cartel deter-
rence is:
a) decreasing in lL;
b) increasing in αRL if lL <
1
2 and decreasing in α
R
L if lL >
1
2 ; and
c) strictly lower under the EU and the US solutions than under the Hungarian and
our suggested solutions.
Proof in Appendix 8.4.
Taking distrust into account changes our previous conclusions in several ways.
First, the liability of colluding firms that did not apply for leniency (DOR), now
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does matter, as it determines the consequences of being betrayed by a co-conspirator.
This “fixes” the first puzzling implication of the standard analysis. It also implies that
minimizing DR is not only important for increasing the incentives to report and apply
for leniency, but also because it shifts damage liability to cartel members other than the
immunity recipient, increasing DOR, and with it, distrust and deterrence.
Second, it shows that the amount of information available to claimants after convic-
tion is no longer irrelevant for optimal deterrence. Even when the liability for damages
of the immunity recipient is optimally set to DR = 0 (or when it is sufficiently low:
lL < 12 ), deterrence increases strictly in the amount of information disclosed to the vic-
tims suing for damages (αRL). This is because deterrence is now mainly driven by an
increased fear of being betrayed and reported, and not mainly by the liability of the
immunity recipient, as before. By increasing the incentive to betray and the cost of
being betrayed by another cartel member, in the presence of a LP, there is now a higher
demand for trust amongst cartel members. This “fixes” also the second puzzling impli-
cation of the standard analysis mentioned in the previous subsection.
Proposition 2c) also indicates that, in principle, the effectiveness of the LP is fur-
ther improved if the immunity applicant is asked to provide more information to the
claimants, beyond the evidence given to the CA. This cooperation is captured by a
value of αRL that is larger than α
R and, in our formal setting, the best policy choice
would be to require the reporting firm to give all the information that is needed to guar-
antee that claimants obtain a complete compensation of the harm suffered, that is to set
αRL = 1. However, one should bear in mind that this requirement would be very difficult
to verify and this is likely to create some degree of uncertainty that may discourage a
leniency application. Indeed, a similar choice is adopted in the US where the amnesty
applicant must demonstrate it had rendered “satisfactory cooperation” to claimants and
produced all documents or other items potentially relevant to the civil action. Yet, it
has been argued that the lack of objective standards for measuring a company’s coop-
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eration had the potential to seriously undermine the intended goals of the legislation.25
We do not formally address this issue that would need a completely different setting in
which uncertainty about the success of the leniency application is introduced.
As before, if the liability of the immunity recipient cannot be minimized (lL > 12 ),
then even when distrust is taken into account, minimizing the amount of information
available to claimants (αRL) can be optimal, as is done in the EU solution.
5 The case of bankruptcy
In this section we extend the analysis to consider the case in which firms’ assets may
be insufficient to compensate the cartel’s victims. This is a relevant extension as our
proposal and the Hungarian regime differ only if the non-reporting firm alone cannot
cover the damages awarded by the court. To keep the analysis as simple as possible,
we assume that each firm has a given amount of assets (W > F) which remains the
same in each and any period, as profits are distributed to shareholders before the fine
is set and damages actions undertaken. Furthermore, we maintain the assumption of
symmetry, meaning that firms have the same assets value.
We have defined γ = W−FD as the ratio between available assets, once the fine has
been paid, and the damage attributable to each firm. In the previous section we consider
the case in which γ ≥ 2αR, a condition that guarantees that in all legal regimes the non-
reporting firm can pay damages in full. Now we evaluate the four legal regimes in the
case in which the applicable rules and the level of assets are such that the non-reporting
firm may go bankrupt, i.e. γ < 2αR. Henceforth, this occurrence will be defined as
NRF, which stands for “non-reporting (firm) fails” . For simplicity, we assume that if
NRF the failed firm is immediately replaced by another identical firm which follows the
same strategy and competes in the market. This ensures that the competitive conditions
25See for instance the submission of the ABA to the Public Roundtable on Antitrust Crim-
inal Penalty Enhancement & Reform Act (ACPERA) held by the US DOJ, available at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1168676/download#American%20Bar%20Association%20(ABA)
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in the market do not change.
First of all we need to redefine the Hungarian legal regime. The policy variable
that changes is the one that defines the liability of the leniency applicant, lH . In the
new scenario, this variable becomes lH = 2 −
γ
αR
, as the reporting firm is liable for all
damages that cannot be paid the other cartelist.
Since we are interested in understanding the effects on deterrence of the LP in the
different regimes, in this section we assume that applying for leniency remains a viable
option in all cases. This means that the reporting firm does not fail. This requires that
W ≥ lLαRLD for any L. Since F = 0 for the leniency applicant, the latter condition can
be written as γ ≥ lLαRL. This is always satisfied in our proposal, as lO = 0. In the other
regimes this condition becomes: γ ≥ αNR (EU), γ ≥ α
R
3 (US) and γ ≥ α
R (Hungarian).
The most stringent condition is the one that arises in the Hungarian regime. Therefore
in the following we assume that αR ≤ γ < 2αR. With this assumption the other regimes
remain the same as in the previous section, since the liability rules do not depend on
the NRF condition. In Appendix 8.5 we will briefly discuss the other cases.
If γε[αR, 2αR), it is easy to verify by inspection that the expected discounted values
of colluding and not reporting the cartel (VNR) and of deviating and reporting (VR (L))
are unaffected. Hence the proof of Proposition 1 remains valid and Proposition 1 holds
for our proposal while the Hungarian solution is no longer optimal as lH is strictly
positive.26
To assess the degree of deterrence in the various legal regimes taking into account
strategic risk, we need to compute the value of the continuation game for the non-
reporting firm, VOR (L). Given that the non-reporting firm pays damages up to its avail-
able assets we have:
VOR (L) = −F −min
{
W − F; (2 − lL)αRLD
}
.




It is immediate to check that VOR = −W in both our solution and the Hungarian
one, since the non-reporting firm always fails (NRF, by definition). In the EU regime
VOR (E) = −F − αNRD as NRF never occurs since γ ≥ αR > αNR. Finally in the US
regime, NRF if γ ≤ 53α
R so that VOR (U) = −F −min
{




Using the above formulas and those for VNR and VR (L) we can compute the critical
discount factors δ∗ (L) in the various regimes. Notice that δ∗ now has kinks where NRF
so that the analysis cannot be done by simply computing derivatives. Hence the proof,
although very simple, becomes more cumbersome. The various δ∗ (L) are derived in
Appendix 8.5 where we also complete the proof of the following:
Proposition 3: If αR ≤ γ < 2αR, taking into account strategic risk, cartel deterrence
is:
a) always higher under our proposed solution than in any other legal regimes;
b) always higher in the US regime than in the EU regime;
c) higher in the Hungarian regime than in the US regime if γ > 53α
R and lower if
γ < 53α
R;
d) higher in the Hungarian regime than in the EU regime if γ > 32α
R − 12α
NR and
lower if γ < 32α
R − 12α
NR.

























. Below each of them we report the ranking of the four legal
regimes in terms of deterrence.
The proposition and figure 2 show that there is a clear winner (the regime we pro-
pose) but that there is not a clear looser, as the Hungarian solution progressively be-
comes worse than the others. To understand this result, consider that if strategic risk
matters (as we maintain), deterrence depends on the combination of two elements: 1)
the attractiveness of the LP for the first leniency applicant, which in turn depends on
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the protection granted to the immunity recipient; and 2) the loss suffered by the firm
that is betrayed.
Figure 2: Graphical representation of Proposition 3
In the regime we propose both are at their maximum, because the immunity recipi-
ent is given full protection, as it is kept immune also on civil grounds, and the betrayed
firm obtains the worst possible payoff, as it fails. Note that, in the parameters’ space
we examine, both outcomes do not depend on the information made available to the
claimants.
In the Hungarian regime the loss of the non-reporting firm is the highest possible.
This is obtained by giving the claimants access to the information provided by the le-
niency applicant. However, this choice negatively affects the protection granted to the
first leniency applicant. Indeed, since the reporting firm has liability of last resort, its
protection progressively diminishes as the available assets of the other cartelist become
lower and its exposure in the civil action increases if the claimants can access the evi-
dence submitted to the CA.
In the EU, the only form of protection given to the reporting firm stems from the
impossibility of using the leniency documents. However, this form of protection also
softens the loss suffered by the non-reporting firm, which, indeed, does not fail.
Finally in the US, the policy choice concerning the access to information increases
the loss of the non-reporting firm. However, the protection of the amnesty recipient
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is limited as it only stems from the detrebling of damages and the fact that the report-
ing firm is responsible only for its direct damages. As a consequence the loss of the
non-reporting firm may not reach its maximum value.
The issue with the existing regimes, (i.e. all but ours), is that the two policy instru-
ments have opposite effects on the two factors that determine the degree of deterrence
and this prevents the achievement of an optimal result. The analysis we have performed
shows that it would be preferable to separate the two effects using the two available
policy instruments. Our proposal does precisely this. The only way of obtaining this
separation is to grant full immunity to the first reporting firm. When this is done, the
other policy instrument can be used to maximize the loss suffered by the non-reporting
firm without impairing the protection of the immunity recipient.
The critical discount factor in the regime we propose is:







and this is the maximum discount factor that can be achieved if γε[αR, 2αR).
In Appendix 8.5 we take up the formal analysis of the remaining cases and show
that our conclusion remains valid. The intuitive explanation is simple. If firms’ assets
are very low, then in all legal regimes, but ours, the LP may become completely inef-
fective, because a firm that applies for leniency faces damages that may be larger than
its available assets and this makes reporting irrational. Indeed, we have that the LP is
ineffective in the Hungarian regime if γ < αR, in the EU if γ < αNR and in the US if
γ < α
R
3 , whereas in our regime, independently of the firm’s assets, reporting is always
the best course of action if a firm decides to play the non-collusive equilibrium. Since
deterrence is stronger when a LP is effective, we have that the rules we propose remain
those that guarantee the highest level of deterrence.
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6 Litigation costs and deterrence vs compensation
In this section, we study how our previous results change when we take into account
litigation costs and the possibility that the immunity recipient could be the preferred
target of damage actions. We then discuss the possible trade-off between deterrence
and victims’ compensation.
6.1 Litigation costs
The previous sections did not consider litigation costs and the possible incentives
of cartel victims to target a specific cartel member in the action for damages. For sim-
plicity we explore this extension only in the case of no bankruptcy. Let T denote the
litigation costs including those that derive from being the preferred target of the action
for damages. 27
If neither or both firms apply for leniency, this cost is equally divided between the
cartel members ( T2 ). This holds also in the EU legal regime.
28
In our solution, the immunity recipient has no liability for damages and the non-
reporting firm(s) become(s) the preferred target, supporting the full cost (T).
It can be shown that the difference between the discount factor thresholds of the
EU and our proposed scenario is increasing in T, which implies the following.
Proposition 4: Taking into account the litigation cost and the possibility of being the
preferred target of damage claims further increases the loss of deterrence implied by
the EU solution relative to our proposed policy.
Proof in Appendix 8.6.
27With joint liability, this cost includes the financial costs of having to pay all the due damages first, and
then the legal cost from recovering part of the damages paid from other cartel members.
28This is because in the EU there is no difference in liability (given that DR = DNR), nor an informational
advantage in suing the immunity recipient (given that αR = αNR ). On the other hand, although the leniency
application is not accessible, there may be other reasons to target the immunity recipient, such as if he is
declared guilty before the action for damages and does not appeal this decision.
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6.2 Deterrence vs. compensation
In this section we consider the potential trade-off between deterrence and compen-
sation, at the center of the legal debate, and we discuss which solution is likely to be
optimal once this is taken into account.
In the presence of potential bankruptcy, the maximum value of liquidated damages
available to compensate victims of a non-deterred cartel (detected through an immu-
nity application) is different from that in section 4. With regard to the legal choices of
liability of the immunity recipient and the amount of information available for damage
actions, we can then state the following:
Lemma 1: If firms may be unable to compensate the victims of cartels uncovered due
to leniency without the contribution of the immunity recipient and the LP remains ef-
fective in all legal regimes (i.e αR < γ < 2αR), these victims may be worse off under
our proposed solution than under the US, EU and Hungarian solutions, while the latter
maximizes victim’s compensation.
Proof in Appendix 8.7.
We proceed by taking a closer look at this trade-off. We will identify the conditions
that must be satisfied to make our proposal preferable to the Hungarian solution and
will argue that those conditions are likely to hold in the real world.
We restrict our attention to customers’ welfare and leave aside any allocative ef-
ficiency considerations that would strongly suggest focusing only on the deterrence
properties of the enforcement system. Let us assume that all cartels (actual and poten-
tial) cause the same level of harm. Without any loss of generality we normalize to 1
the overall harm that would be caused by all potential cartels to both direct and indirect
purchasers.
We define the “uncompensated harm”, U, as the harm that is caused by those car-
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tels that are not deterred and for which the actual victims are not compensated. After
all, if consumers were perfectly compensated, consumer welfare would be unaffected
by cartels and if all cartels were all deterred consumer welfare would not depend on
the outcome of a damage suit. The level of uncompensated harm depends (also) on the
rules discussed in this paper. Hence, we can argue that one regime is better than another
if the uncompensated harm is lower. We limit our comparison to the Hungarian regime
and our proposal as the former maximizes actual compensation and the latter maxi-
mizes deterrence. The analysis can be easily extended to the other cases. As before,
this comparison refers only to the legal choices regarding the liability of the immunity
recipient and the amount of information available for subsequent actions for damages.
Let us denote by UO and UH the uncompensated harm that cartels cause if our so-
lution or the Hungarian regime are adopted, respectively. Victims of cartels uncovered
ex-officio by a CA receive the same amount of compensation in both regimes. There-
fore, in this analysis, we assume that cartels’ detection occurs only through the LP.
The uncompensated harm under ours and the Hungarian regimes is, respectively,
UO = [1 −G (δO)] (1 − αβλ) and UH = [1 −G (δH)] (1 − αβ) ,
where δO and δH are the critical discount factors for cartel stability under each regime;
G(δ) is the c.d.f. of the discount factor, which represents the fraction of deterred cartels
in each regime; α is the share of the harm suffered by the undeterred cartels’ victims
that is compensated; β is the share of undeterred cartels which are detected due to
the LP and λ is the share of awarded damages covered by the cartelists other than the
immunity recipient.29
We have assumed that if all cartelists are kept liable they will be able to pay the total
29We assume that, for some unmodeled reason, some cartel members still apply for leniency. This is
because the formal model would imply that β is zero as either a cartel is deterred, as potential cartelists
anticipate that the LP would make it unstable, or if formed none of the cartelists report it. This would make
our analysis trivial: the LP would only matter for its effects on deterrence.
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damages awarded by the court.30 For the sake of exposition, we write GO = G(δO) and
GH = G(δH). Since deterrence is increasing in αR and αRO = 1 ≥ αRH (as demonstrated
before), then we have that GO > GH . The other parameters all are in the interval
[0, 1].31
Our solution outperforms the Hungarian one if UO < UH . This condition can be
rewritten as
(GO −GH) (1 − αβλ) > αβ (1 −GH) (1 − λ) . (3)
The left-hand side of the inequality represents the benefit of our solution, which is
given by the harm that would have been caused by the deterred cartels that would not
be deterred under the Hungarian solution (GO −GH), to the extent that this harm is not
compensated in the successive actions for damages (1 − αβλ).
The right-hand side represents the cost of our solution, which is given by the
share of awarded damages, caused by the undeterred cartels in the Hungarian regime
αβ(1 − GH), which remains uncompensated precisely because the immunity recipient
is kept immune from any civil liability (1 − λ).32 Simple manipulation of condition (3)
leads to the following:
Proposition 5: The uncompensated cartel harm in the legal regime we propose is
smaller than the uncompensated harm in the Hungarian regime if the following condi-
tion holds:






Although there are no general theoretical arguments that prove that the inequality
30This does not cause any loss of generality. Indeed, the possibility that some cartelists are unable to pay
awarded damages in full even if the immunity recipient is kept liable can be accounted for by adjusting α
accordingly.
31As mentioned earlier, although there are treble damages in the US, implying that α can take a value up
to 3, Lande (1993) argues that US claimants are able to recover only a fraction of their actual losses.
32Condition (3) has a more general applicability: it can be used to assess any policy that improves de-
terrence while limiting the ability of the victims of actual cartels to be compensated. In this general case
GO − GH represents the positive impact on deterrence of the policy under exam, and 1 − λ the negative
impact on the victim’s possibility of obtaining full compensation.
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in Proposition 4 always holds, identifying the exact condition that would make the
legal regime we propose superior to the other regimes also in terms of “uncompensated
harm” is useful as one can investigate if, as a matter of fact and in the real world, this
condition is likely to be satisfied. Ultimately this is an empirical question that we do
not address in this paper. However, by inspecting this condition one can understand that
the result depends on the proportion of actual damages that are effectively redeemed
in civil actions and on the extent to which cartel members other than the immunity
recipient can pay awarded damages.
We believe that there are good reasons to believe that the former is sufficiently low
and/ or the latter sufficiently high so that our solution performs better that the Hungarian
one. In Appendix 8.8 we provide a more detailed discussion of the reasons behind this
statement. In a nutshell they are: (1) the bankruptcy risk is likely to be low as we are
not aware of any EU or US cases where awarded antitrust damages have led to the
bankruptcy of a defendant; (2) the share of recovered damages is likely to be rather
small since damage repayments are uncertain, lengthy and only some affected parties
claim them; (3) empirical evidence suggests that the rate of cartel detection is likely to
be low; and (4) if the immunity recipient is granted immunity also on civil grounds, the
LP may become a more powerful deterrence mechanism.
7 Conclusion
Does the pursuit of the primary goal of the public enforcement system, i.e. achiev-
ing an optimal level of deterrence of anti-competitive conducts, necessarily require the
amount of damages that claimants can expect to recover to be sacrificed?
The position of the ECJ summarized in Section 2 has the merit of clarifying that ac-
tions for damages initiated by the victims of an antitrust infringement may increase the
level of deterrence. In this respect, public and private enforcement are not in conflict
with each other. However, as far as hardcore cartels are concerned, the public interest
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has been pursued in many jurisdictions through the adoption of LPs. The legal debate
has been centered on the question of whether damage actions can jeopardize the effec-
tiveness of these programs.
In our view, many in this legal debate have incorrectly taken for granted that an
inherent conflict exists between the proper functioning of a LP and private damage
claims, so that any proper legislation necessarily implies a compromise between the
interest of the public enforcement system and the interest of private cartel victims to
be fully compensated. The EU Directive on damage actions follows this path. Our
analysis shows that a compromise is not actually needed: one does not have to limit
the ability of cartel victims to recover their losses to preserve the effectiveness of a LP.
In fact, damage actions can even improve the effectiveness of such programs, through
a legal regime in which the civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized, while
the other cartelists are jointly and severally liable toward all cartel’s victims, and full
access to all evidence collected by the competition authority, is granted to claimants.
The theoretical model discussed in the previous sections shows that the optimal so-
lution is to limit as far as possible the damage liability of the immunity recipient.
The EU Directive limits this liability only marginally, but it also limits the infor-
mation that is available to the claimants. These two instruments (lower liability of the
immunity recipient and restriction of the available information) have different effects
on deterrence and on the victims’ ability to be fully compensated. Indeed, given that
all cartelists are jointly and severally liable towards all of the cartel’s victims, reducing
the level of liability of the immunity recipient does not typically affect the amount of
damages they can obtain. In contrast, limiting the evidence they can use in the damage
actions reduces the expected value of the final compensation.
To give concrete application to the legal principle that any victim has the right to be
fully compensated, the optimal solution, i.e. our proposal, is to grant complete access
to all documents submitted by the immunity applicant and restrict (possibly eliminate)
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the civil liability of the immunity recipient. The resolution of restricting access to
the information that is available in the Commission’s file emerges as sub-optimal and
might be considered at odds with the right of victims to obtain full compensation as
recognized by the European courts.
In the analysis we assumed that only the first applicant can receive immunity from
fines. As noted earlier, restricting access to LP statements and settlement submissions
may be even more troublesome in the increasing number of cases in which the EC
awards some degree of leniency to - and then settles with - most or all the members of
a cartel (Marvão & Spagnolo (2018b)). Then, the final decision will be informationally
very poor, making leniency and settlements highly attractive but private actions much
more difficult.
The US legislation is also sub-optimal because it only detrebles damages for the
successful immunity recipient who, therefore, remains liable for single damages. The
solution adopted in Hungary, before the Directive, was instead optimal when there is
no risk of bankruptcy.
We have also considered the case in which firms may go bankrupt and therefore
claimants cannot recover the entire awarded damages if the immunity recipient is not
liable. Our analysis shows that also in this scenario our proposal remains optimal if
deterrence is pursued. However, a conflict between deterrence and the victims’ right
to compensation may exist in this case. The Hungarian solution allows to maximize
actual compensation and is still preferable to the EU and US regimes in terms of deter-
rence if firms’ assets are not too low.
Finally, we have argued that the trade-off between deterrence and the right to com-
pensation can be interpreted as a trade-off between the welfare of customers of potential
but deterred cartels, and the welfare of customers of actual cartels then reported by one
of the conspirators. On this basis, we have put forward arguments that support our con-
jecture that our proposal would entail a cost, in terms of risk of reduced compensation
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of actual victims, largely outweighed by its benefit, which is the full “compensation”
of customers of potential cartels that are never damaged as the cartels are effectively
deterred.
A final note is warranted. Cartel detection may occur also through channels other
than the LP. Cartels victims may report their suspicions to a competition authority and
trigger an investigation. They may have an incentive to do so also by the prospect of
recovering damages, once the infringement has been proved. Limiting cartel members’
liability and access to information would reduce the incentive to search for signs of
cartels. We do not discuss this detection mechanism in our paper as we focus on rules
that apply when the cartel is discovered through a leniency applicant’s report. If the
cartel is discovered through a different channel these rules do not affect in any way car-
tel members’ liability and the information that claimant can use in the following action
for damages and, therefore, they do not alter the incentives for customers to search for
cartels that did not self-report.
The issue may become relevant only when leniency is given also to firms after the
cartel is discovered by a customers’ complaint. In that case, our position is that the
leniency applicant should not be given full immunity, nor protection from civil liability
and that the information provided by the leniency applicant should be made available
to the claimant in follow-on civil actions. Fully exploring the implications of this pro-
posal, however, would require a completely novel paper.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In this proof we treat lL and αRL as continuous variables. Since the fraction of indus-
tries in which cartels are sustainable in equilibrium is decreasing in δ, cartel deterrence
is higher for a higher δ. Taking the derivative of δ with respect to the share of damages








which is strictly negative. Since lLαRL ≥ 0, this implies that δ, hence cartel deterrence,
reaches a maximum at the corner lLαRL = 0. Since we assumed α
R ≥ αNR > 0, setting
lLαRL = 0 necessarily requires lL = 0, which is only the case under our proposal and -
under the current assumption of no risk of bankruptcy - in the Hungarian legal regime.
The proposition statement follows.
8.2 Empirical evidence on strategic risk
In this section, we provide suggestive evidence on the importance of distrust/ strate-
gic risk concerns in cartels by presenting transcripts from public reports on cartels con-
victed by the European Commission. These show that distrust between cartel members
is a serious issue for cartel partners. In fact, we also report some examples where
the risk of a specific cartel member abandoning the collusive agreement is accurately
anticipated and evaluated.
8.2.1 Examples of distrust from a specific cartel member who reports the cartel
1. Retail food packaging (2015)33
33EC, Decision of 24.6.2015, case AT.39563, par 241 and 270.
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• “This tense situation is also reflected in an internal Coopbox report of 27
June 2005 concerning the situation of the market and relations with cartel
participants, which states that “today there are no conditions to find an
agreement with Linpac (...) it is not trustworthy”. (...) Finally the car-
tel participants discussed possible strategies on how to protect their plan
against Magic Pack, who was not to be trusted.”
• Linpac was the first cartel member to report the cartel and receive immunity
from fines.
2. Fine art auction houses (2002)34
• “There were also fears that Christie’s would not adhere to the agreed com-
mission structure.”
• In fact, Christies was the first firm to report the cartel and receive immunity
from fines.
8.2.2 Examples of distrust from a specific cartel member
1. Smart card chips (2014)35
• “[...] especially in 2004 competitors feared that Samsung would drive
pricing down with its aggressive pricing policy based on its better cost
structure (...) [...]’s understanding was that [...] no longer trusted At-
mel after their loss of the Gemplus tender mentioned in recital (120), and
wanted to secure share at Axalto by accepting Axalto’s aggressive target
price.”
2. Prestressing Steel (2010)
34EC, Decision of 30.10.2002, case COMP/E-2/37.784, par 113.
35EC, Decision of 3.9.2014, case AT.39574, par 121 and 124.
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• “At the meeting held in Malpensa on 04.09.2001 (see recital (285)), the
Italian producers present agreed to meet to fix the sales prices in Europe.
The typed minutes from SLM state that Tycsa’s absence raised fears.”
8.2.3 Examples of distrust between cartel members
1. Retail food packaging (2015)
• “The intensity and frequency of the meetings shows that the cartel partici-
pants did not fully trust each other at that time.”
2. Sorbates (2003)
• “There was some distrust among the producers concerning the implemen-
tation of target prices and volume quotas. The participants knew that sales
figures were often understated. At the autumn joint meeting, Hoechst and
the Japanese producers compared sales results to date for the current cal-
endar year with the volume quotas established at the spring joint meeting
so that they could monitor compliance with the market allocations.”
• Note that Hoechst was the second leniency reporter (50% fine reduction).
3. Vitamins (2001)
• “According to Roche the significant degree of distrust prevailing between
the participants prevented their agreeing a mechanism for fixing target
quantities for consecutive quarterly and half-yearly periods. Tanabe con-
firms that the participants did not agree on a mechanism for fixing target
quantities on an ongoing basis. Merck however says that on the basis of
Roche’s forecast of the expected market for 1992, the sales volumes of each
producer were in fact agreed. This is confirmed by the documentary evi-
dence.”
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• Note that the first reporter was Rhone-Poulenc but Roche was the first re-
porter in subsequent cartel reports within this case (vitamins B2, B5, C and
D3).
8.3 Discussion of strategic risk and derivation of the critical dis-
count factor δ∗
In this Appendix, using a very simple example, we explain why risk considerations
are likely to determine the equilibrium selection in a coordination game and derive the
condition (1) that captures how deterrence works through strategic risk.
Consider the following game:
Table 1: Game matrix (1)
C2 R2
C1 A, a D, b
R1 B, d C, c
,
in which A > B > C > D for player 1 and a > b > c > d for player 2. This game
has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (C1, C2) and (R1, R2). The former Pareto
dominates the latter: both players are better off if they select this equilibrium. However,
this may not be enough to lead to this outcome as (C1, C2) might be riskier than (R1,
R2). To grasp this concept, suppose that player 1 is uncertain about the strategy that
2 will play and attaches the same probability, 0.5, to both. The less risky strategy
for player 1, given her ignorance, is the one that maximizes her expected payoff. For
instance, R1 is less risky than C1 if 0.5A+0.5D < 0.5B+0.5C. The strategy profile (R1,
R2) is risk dominant if the two strategies are the least risky for both players (Harsanyi
& Selten, 1988). Suppose that indeed (R1, R2) is risk dominant. This implies that the
two following conditions hold:
A + D < B + C and a + d < b + c,
which can be rewritten as:
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D −C < B − A and d − c < b − a.
Note that (D − C) is the loss player 1 suffers if she deviates from the equilibrium
(R1, R2) and (B − A) is the loss for deviating from the equilibrium (C1, C2): Similarly,
for (d − c) and (b − a). This means that all these terms are negative by definition.
Therefore, we can summarize the two conditions that make (R1, R2) risk dominant in
the following simpler condition as defined by Harsanyi & Selten (1988):
(D −C)(d − c) > (B − A)(b − a).
The term (D−C)(d − c) is called the Nash product of the pair of strategies (R1, R2)
and (B−A)(b−a) is the Nash product of (C1, C2). If the game is symmetric (i.e. A = a,
B = b, C = c and D = d) the Nash products are (D − C)2 and (B − A)2 and the above
condition becomes:
(D −C)2 > (B − A)2,
which is equivalent to |D −C| > |B − A|, and since C > D and A > B, becomes:
(C − D) > (A − B).
In the following we will use this condition to identify the risk dominant strategy.
If the game is symmetric and this condition is satisfied, then the outcome of the game
is (R1, R2) if players’ decisions are led by risk considerations, even if (C1, C2) Pareto
dominates (R1, R2).
The reader may wonder why risk considerations should matter in the case of explicit
collusion where players agree to play the more profitable equilibrium. To understand
this, one has to consider that the collusive agreement is just a pre-play communication
in which each player reassures the other that she will choose the collusive strategy.
However, this reassurance may not be really able to affect the other player’s expecta-
tion. Consider Table 1 again. Player 2 in any case is better off if 1 plays C1 (a > d
and b > c). So, she should try to convince player 1 to play C1. The only way to do
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so is to reassure 1 that she will play C2, because only if 2 plays C2 it is in the best
interest of 1 to play C1. Therefore, the reassurance has very little value, as 1 knows
that 2 would make it even if in fact she plans to play R2, so that, in the end it works
only if player 1 trusts player 2. The deterrence effect we are interested in hinges on the
possibility of impairing this trust. By luring cartel members to report with the promise
of a very favorable treatment, a legal regime may reduce the level of trust firms have in
each other. This in turn has a stronger deterrence effect the riskier is for the two players
the decision to incorrectly trust the other, i.e. the stronger the “strategic risk”. The
relevance of trust in real life cartels has been documented in Appendix 8.2. Moreover,
the experimental evidence cited in the paper shows that strategic risk is an important
deterrence channel.
Now we can turn to the analysis of a repeated interaction. Following Spagnolo
(2004), Blonski et al. (2011) and Blonski & Spagnolo (2015), we can simply build a
2x2 game matrix where the payoff associated to any strategy profile is given by the
expected discounted payoff of the continuation game, as in Table 2.
Table 2: Game matrix (2)
C j R j
Ci VNR,VNR VOR,VR
Ri VR,VOR VBR,VBR
In this matrix VR is the expected discounted payoff of a firm that plays the non-
collusive equilibrium and reports the cartel to the CA while the opponent plays the
collusive equilibrium, VBR is the expected discounted payoff of a firm when both firms
play the non-collusive equilibrium and report the cartel to the CA and VOR is the ex-
pected discounted payoff of the betrayed firm that plays the collusive equilibrium while












−F − (1 + lL)αRLD
2
,
VOR = −F − αRLD.
In all legal regimes we have that VNR > VR > VBR > VOR. Hence, game matrix (2)
has the same payoff ranking as game matrix (1). Thus, we can directly apply the results
described above and state that the collusive equilibrium risk dominates the reporting
equilibrium if:
VNR − VR ≥ VBR − VOR. (5)
From condition (5) we can derive the critical discount factor δ∗ which takes into
account strategic risk:










which is condition 1 reported in the paper, in section 4.2. This discount factor δ∗ reflects
the riskiness to cooperate.




, δ∗ can also be expressed as:





where VNR′ is the numerator of VNR.
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8.4 Proof of Proposition 2





continuous variable in the interval [0, 2).












LD (1 − 2lL)
]2 ,
which is strictly negative.
Differentiating δ∗ with respect to αRL yields
∂δ∗
∂αRL









LD (1 − 2lL)
]2 ,
which is strictly positive if lL < 12 and strictly negative if lL >
1
2 .
Proposition 2c) is implied by Proposition 2a) and 2b). A more direct proof is
obtained by comparing the critical discount factor in the two regimes O and H with the
critical values in the other two regimes. The former is
δ∗ (O) = δ∗ (H) = 1 −






δ∗ (E) = 1 −






δ∗ (U) = 1 −







It is immediate to see that δ∗ (O) = δ∗ (H) > δ∗ (U) > δ∗ (E) as αR > 13α
R > −αNR.
46
8.5 Robustness check with bankruptcy
In this appendix we complete the proof of Proposition 3 and discuss the remaining
cases.
Proof of Proposition 3
If αR ≤ γ < 2αR the critical discount that takes into account strategic risk in the
different regimes is described by the following equations.
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if γ ≥ 53α
R
if γ < 53α
R
.
Comparing the critical discount factor in our solution with that arising in the other
cases, we find that δ∗ (O) > δ∗ (E) iff W > F − 2αNRD; δ∗ (O) > δ∗ (H) iff γ < 2αR;
when γ ≥ 53α
R, δ∗ (O) > δ∗ (U) iff γ ≥ 23α
R, and when γ < 53α
R, δ∗ (O) > δ∗ (U) iff
αR
2 D > 0. All the necessary and sufficient conditions just identified are always satisfied
given the admissible values of the relevant parameters. This proves Proposition 3a).
Note that the critical discount factor with strategic risk in our regime, δ∗ (O), is
(weakly) higher than the critical discount factor stemming from the ICC in the same
regime, δ (O), iff W2 ≥ 2Π. This is always satisfied under the assumption that the fine
is “meaningful” (i.e. F2 ≥ 2Π, see section 4.2) and since we have assumed that W > F.
Note that the fine being “meaningful” is a sufficient but not necessary condition.
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We can now compare the US and the EU regimes. When γ ≥ 53α
R, δ∗ (U) > δ∗ (E)
iff 13α
R > −αNR, and if γ < 53α
R, δ∗ (U) > δ∗ (E) iff γ > αR − 2αNR. Again, these
conditions always hold, which proves Proposition 3b).
The comparison between the Hungarian solution and the US one reveals that for
any αR ≤ γ < 2αR, we find that δ∗ (H) > δ∗ (U) iff γ > 53α
R; Proposition 3c) follows.
Finally, δ∗ (H) ≥ δ∗ (E) iff γ ≥ 32α
R − 12α
NR (Proposition 3d)).
Bankruptcy and γ < αR
Here we briefly discuss the (rather unlikely) case that all cartelists’ assets are in-
sufficient to cover the awarded damages when claimants have access to the leniency
documents, i.e. γ < αR.




These conditions guarantee that in the EU and in the US regimes a firm which deviates,
also applies for leniency, if this does not provoke its bankruptcy. However, if γ < αR
depending on the legal regime we discuss, it might be that a firm that reports the cartel
to the CA does not have sufficient assets to pay damages and fails. If this does not
happen the analysis conducted in the previous section remains valid and shows that the
critical discount factor in our regime is higher than the one arising in the other regimes.
We therefore need to ascertain when the reporting firm goes bankrupt.
A firm goes bankrupt when γ < αR in the Hungarian regime, γ < 13α
R in the US
regime and γ < αNR in the EU. When one of these conditions is satisfied a deviating
firm does not apply for leniency. Hence the LP is ineffective and the critical discount
factor is the one that stems from the ICC without the LP: in particular if γ ≥ αNR, we
have









In the regime we propose the firm that deviates finds it optimal to apply for leniency
for any value of γ and ρF. The critical discount factor in our proposal stemming from
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the ICC is






and is apparently higher than δNL. Deterrence is obviously stronger if we consider
strategic risk as δ∗ (O) > δ (O) as discussed before.
When γ < αNR if the firm is caught by an autonomous investigation of the CA, it





1 − (1 − ρ)δ
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In the regime we propose the reporting firm never fails, while the non-reporting one
always does. Moreover both firms fail if the cartel is uncovered by the CA. Therefore,









and again is clearly higher than δγ<αNR . Moreover the critical discount factor in our




1 − Π − ρWW
2
 , (10)
which shows that deterrence is even stronger in this case under the assumptions of the
model. Hence, all our conclusions remain valid.
Finally, if ρF < αNRD(1 − ρ) a firm that deviates in the EU regime does not apply





NR). The critical discount factor is thus either expression (8) or expression
(9) depending on the value of γ, while in our regime it is either expression (7) (if
γ ≥ αNR) or expression (10) (if γ < αNR). We can conclude that also in this case our
solution outperforms the alternative regimes.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Taking into account the cost of litigation and of being the preferred target of the
damage action (T ), the new value functions become














; VRO(T ) = V
R − 0;




; VORO (T ) = V
OR − T.
Using equation (6), from subsection 8.3, for δ∗, the new discount factor thresholds
are given by




(VBR − T2 ) − (V
OR − T2 ) + (V





VBR − VOR + VR − T2
;




(VBR − T2 ) − (V





VBR − VOR + VR + T2
.
The difference between the discount factor thresholds of ours and the EU solutions
is the following





T − ρ T
2
2
(VBR − VOR + VR)2 − T 24
.
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Differentiating this difference with respect to T yields











[(VBR − VOR + VR)2 − T 24 ]
2
,
which is strictly positive.
8.7 Proof of Lemma 1
In our analysis, we focus on the legal choices of liability of the immunity recipient
and the amount of information available for damage actions. This can be interpreted
as if a jurisdiction (eg. the EU) would adopt the solution from another jurisdiction (eg.
Hungary) in regards to the two policy variables lL and αRL only, rather than the entire
legal regime.
If αR ≤ γ < 2αR actually compensated (paid) damages, denoted by P (L), are:











Hence we have that P (O) < P (U) ≤ P (H); further we have P (E) < P (H); finally we
have that P (O) ≤ P(E) iff γ ≤ 2αNR and P (E) ≤ P (U) iff γ ≥ 2αNR − 13α
R. This is
shown in figure 3.
This proves that, if the non-reporting firm does not have sufficient assets to pay
damages in full, but this can be paid with the aggregated assets of all cartelists, the
Hungarian regime guarantees the highest amount of actually compensated damages
while our proposal leads to a value of compensated damages that is certainly lower
than the one obtained in the Hungarian and in US regimes and may be lower than the
one in the EU regime.
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of Lemma 1
8.8 Discussion on Deterrence vs. Compensation
Below, we discuss some reasons to presume that the benefit of our proposal is likely
to be larger than its cost.
(1) The bankruptcy risk. The left-hand side of condition (4) represents the extent
to which keeping the immunity recipient liable is necessary to guarantee that awarded
damages are fully paid. We are not aware of cases, either in the US or the EU, where a
court’s decision to award antitrust damages has caused the bankruptcy of a defendant
(although this risk is often cited). Keeping in mind that all cartel members are already
severally and jointly liable toward the cartel’s victims, we believe that the rare (if any)
occurrence of bankruptcy cases due to the award of antitrust damages suggests that λ
is likely to be close to 1 and, therefore, the left-hand side of condition (4) close to 0.36
(2) The share of recovered damages. We believe that α (i.e. the share of damages
caused by the undeterred cartels’ which is compensated) is quite low and we would not
be surprised if an empirical analysis showed that its likely value is significantly below
0.5. The reason for this is threefold. Firstly, cartels do not only affect actual direct
purchasers of the cartelized products but also other players along the value chain, both
downstream and upstream, as well as potential customers of the cartelized products
36In our simple model, if λ = 1 we have that GO = GH , so that the right-hand side of (4) is 0. Yet,
the model does not consider that, under the Hungarian solution, the immunity recipient is still likely to
be involved in the trial, whereas in the legal regime we propose, it will be totally exonerated from any civil
liability. If we consider this additional element, the cost that the trial would impose on the immunity recipient
in the Hungarian regime would make the LP less attractive, therefore diminishing its deterrent effect.
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that are not served at the cartel price and potential customers of downstream products
that are equally excluded from consumption as a consequence of the higher price. In
principle, all these subjects could sue cartel members in order to recover the harm they
suffered.37 In practice, suppliers and indirect purchasers very rarely do so and potential
customers never do.
Secondly, damage repayment is uncertain and lengthy, and civil actions entail costs
that are only partially reimbursed by the losing party. These costs include in-house
counsels, executive and board of directors’ time, and the distraction of employees’
time and efforts from business activity.
Thirdly, frequently the statute of limitations impedes the recovery of damages oc-
curred in the initial years of the violation and, in some cases, may immunize cartel
members from any damage payout.
(3) The rate of cartel detection. Let us now consider the likely range of values for
β, i.e. the rate of undeterred cartels which are detected through a leniency application.
Theoretically, in a deterministic model this value is 0. In fact, we observe some cases
in which an application occurs before the start of an investigation by a CA. However,
there is evidence that these are infrequent. Marx et al. (2015) estimate that 80-90%
of leniency applications received by the US DOJ happened after the DOJ launched an
investigation, and Marvão (2015) reports that, in the EU, 51% of the 377 leniency ap-
plications in the period of 1996-2014 were filed after an investigation was opened.38
Hence, the rate of detection, β, is also likely to be very low. Again, we think that it
would be safe to predict that β is below 0.5.
(4) The rate of cartel deterrence. If the two above educated guesses of the true
37However, in the US, indirect purchasers do not have standing for infringements of federal antitrust law.
38A decision to apply for leniency, even if there is no sign that an ex-officio investigation may be opened
in the near future, is often linked to an extraordinary event such as a merger or take-over, when the new
owners/management become aware of the violations during the due diligence process and decide to “clear
the table” of any previous misbehavior. Other pre-investigation leniency applications are due to a knock-on
effect whereby the start of an investigation in one market triggers a leniency application in other markets
where one or more of the firms involved in the first investigation operate. For example, in the period of 1996
to 2014, 20 of the 46 cartels reported to the European Commission, pre-investigation, were already being
investigated in the US (see Marvão & Spagnolo (2018b)) for more on “Leniency Inflation” in the EU.
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is above 1, which is the maximum (and implausible) value of the left-hand side term
of condition (4). This does not suffice to conclude that this condition is satisfied, as
the last term on the right-hand side may still be lower than 1. On this, we can only
say that if the immunity recipient is granted immunity also on civil grounds, we sus-
pect that the LP may become a powerful deterrence mechanism, so that the fraction of
undeterred cartels (1 −Go) is relatively low and there is an improvement in deterrence
with respect to the Hungarian regime (Go − GH )39, and even more so with respect to
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